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Water They Trying to Say: Louisiana’s Paradoxical 
Approach to Surface Water Management and 
Regulation 
“[F]resh water has become a strategic resource that 
increasingly pits the interests of the places that need it against the 
places that have it.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
H2O. Two microscopic atoms of hydrogen covalently bonded 
with one equally miniscule atom of oxygen.2 Despite its infinitely 
small composition, this molecule has had a major and significant 
impact on the culture and, consequently, the legal system of the 
State of Louisiana. 
From Louisiana’s beginning in 1682, water has played a key role 
in defining the state’s landscape and environmental identity.3 In an 
effort to manage this precious natural resource, Louisiana has evolved 
“a hodgepodge of laws, rules, regulations, and regulatory 
authorities.”4 Recently developed industry practices have forced the 
state to address this “hodgepodge” of water law as it applies to 
theories of ownership and requires regulation. Particularly, the 
question has arisen whether the state constitution demands 
compensation for surface water use.5 The statutory scheme provides 
that no person shall be charged for use of things owned in the state’s 
public capacity, such as running waters.6 Indisputably, a legal 
ambiguity exists that demands clarification if Louisiana law is to 
effectively address the emerging issues relating to water rights. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2015, by JOANN T. HYMEL. 
 1. Mark Davis & James Wilkins, A Defining Resource: Louisiana’s Place in 
the Emerging Water Economy, 57 LOY. L. REV. 273, 284 (2011) (citing SANDRA 
POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY (W.W. Norton & Co. 1997). 
 2. Jill Granger, H2O: The Mystery, Art, and Science of Water: The Chemistry 
of Water: Structure Means Function, SWEET BRIAR COLLEGE (Sept. 22, 2013, 8:15 
PM), http://witcombe.sbc.edu/water/chemistrystructure.html, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/YN7Y-CDCW. 
 3. LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., OFFICE OF CONSERVATION, Ground Water 
Resources Commission Meeting, Dec. 7, 2011, http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/OC 
/env_div/gw_res/GWRCMeeting031411Final.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/XU7F-A7YW. 
[hereinafter Meeting]. 
 4. Id. at 1. 
 5. See generally LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(A). 
 6. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 
(2010). 
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This comment explores the inconsistencies in Louisiana law in 
relation to the resulting implications of the current management and 
regulation scheme of the state’s running waters. Part I of this 
comment provides an overview of Louisiana’s water resources and 
the environmental impact endured as a result of industrial 
enterprises and other influences, offering an illustration of the water 
needs of the state and the possible ramifications that may result 
under the existing structure. Next, Part II focuses on the challenges 
the Louisiana Constitution presents, setting forth an analysis of the 
various sources of law that have generated the problematic situation 
and proposing textual and jurisprudential perspectives to convey the 
ambiguities with regard to ownership theories and issues of 
compensation relating to Louisiana water rights. The comment then 
discusses in Part III the applicable Attorney General’s opinions 
concerning surface water use and the specific plan set forth to 
address the legal issue: Act No. 955. Finally, Part IV outlines a 
suggested solution, specifically how to interpret Act No. 955 in 
relation to other sources of law in an effort to develop a workable 
revision that allows for permanent instruction. 
I. MISMANAGEMENT OF LOUISIANA’S WEALTH 
A. Water Wealth 
Sometimes, too much of a good thing just might be a bad thing. In 
the case of the current state of Louisiana’s water wealth, such a 
statement is relatively accurate due to Louisiana’s failure to establish 
and maintain an effective water regulatory framework. Ranking 
fourth in the nation in total surface water area,7 Louisiana is certainly 
a water-rich state. While approximately 17% percent of Louisiana’s 
territorial area is covered by water,8 over 8.5 billion gallons of water 
are withdrawn from surface and groundwater supplies on a daily 
basis.9 Properly considered a “Sportsman’s Paradise,”10 Louisiana 
                                                                                                             
 7. Steven J. Levine, Ground Water: Louisiana’s Quasi-Fictional and Truly 
Fugacious Mineral, 44 LA. L. REV. 1123, 1127 (1984) (citing LA. DEP’T OF TRANSP. 
& DEV., LA. STATE SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION COMM., LOUISIANA’S NATURAL 
RESOURCES – A CONSERVATION PLAN FOR THE FUTURE 5). 
 8. U.S. DEP’T OF COM., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, (2010), https://www.census 
.gov/geo/reference/state-area.html, archived at https://perma.cc/YLP2-PPBL. 
 9. B. PIERRE SARGENT, LA. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & DEV., IN COOPERATION WITH 
THE U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER RESOURCES 
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 17 (REVISED): WATER USE IN LOUISIANA, 2010 (2012), 
available at http://la.water.usgs.gov/publications/pdfs/WaterUse 2010.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/R49T-TNNQ (of this total, about 1.6 billion gallons per day (19%) 
was from groundwater and about 7 billion gallons per day (81%) was from surface 
water). 
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boasts a profuse water supply, which has played a central role in the 
state’s history and growth, providing a habitat for fisheries and 
sustaining wildlife, as well as a source of abundant water-related 
recreational activities.11 However, the legal provisions surrounding 
this natural resource are quite abstruse, “defined more by specific uses 
and periodic crises that command intense but brief attention than by a 
systematic approach to management.”12 Given emerging regional 
industrial activities and surrounding states looking for additional 
water supplies, Louisiana now faces a future in which this typically 
abundant resource is quickly becoming scarce and thus demands a 
“well thought-out and integrated approach to its stewardship.”13 
In this instance, proper instruction and competent management 
of the state’s natural resources require considerable attention. 
However, amidst efforts of water regulation remains the perplexity 
that “water is simultaneously a precious life-giving necessity, a 
commodity with universal utility in industry, and a nuisance to be 
disposed of, diverted, and controlled.”14 In response to the situation 
at hand, a mixture of regulatory authorities has developed an 
assortment of rules and regulations to confront the complicated 
organization of the many forms of water.15 
The term “water law” is used to describe the general body of law 
surrounding the governance of the use and control of the natural 
resource.16 As water has become a highly coveted commodity, the 
legal field has evolved to now encompass the following areas: surface 
water, ground water, environmental mandates, interstate and 
international interests, public and private rights, and a growing role 
                                                                                                             
 
 10. Craig Gautreaux, Keeping Louisiana a Sportsman’s Paradise, 55 LA. 
AGRIC., no. 2, Spring 2012, at 14 (2012), http://www.lsuagcenter.com/NR/rdonlyres 
/4FD2152C-45BF-413C-9265-24C6567A8E82/86488/Spring2012_v55_n3.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/S52S-8ZY8. 
 11. See H2Woe: Louisiana’s Water Worries, LA. PUBLIC SQUARE (2012), http: 
//www.lpb.org/images/lps_uploads/201207waterwoes2.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/UJ6M-RX8J. [hereinafter H2Woe]. 
 12. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 273. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Managing Louisiana’s Groundwater Resources with Supplemental 
Information on Surface Water Resources: An Interim Report to the Louisiana 
Legislature, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., THE LA. GROUND WATER RES. COMM’N. 1 
(Mar. 15, 2012), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/conservation/groundwater/12 
.Final.GW.Report.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G4PW-Y7KW. [hereinafter 
Report]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 284 (citing George A. Gould, Water 
Rights Systems, in WATER RIGHTS IN THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 8—10 (Kenneth 
R. Wright, ed. 1998)). 
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for the federal government.17 As previously mentioned, Louisiana 
water law, similar to most other water-rich states, is more of a 
jumbled assortment rather than “a systematic approach to ordering 
and managing water resources.”18 The state’s jurisprudence focuses 
on matters such as “drainage, the ownership of banks and water 
bottoms, and rights of access” instead of issues regarding diversion 
and questions concerning the location and specific use of certain 
water bodies.19 As water remains in high demand, its availability and 
presence is increasingly becoming the defining resource of the 
twenty-first century, similar to the role oil played in shaping much of 
the social and economic development during the twentieth century.20 
Nonetheless, regardless of whether water is truly “the new oil,”21 the 
accessibility, convenience and availability of water supplies is already 
changing the nation’s economic and cultural landscape.22 
B. More Industry, More Water (More Problems) 
Ranking first among all of the states in its industrial use of 
water,23 Louisiana clearly has reason to maintain its usable wealth of 
natural resources. However, recent industrial and agricultural 
activities, in addition to drought and saltwater intrusion, pose a 
serious threat to both aquifer levels and water quality.24 In this 
respect, future distribution might be seriously diminished as a result 
of deteriorating supply and treatment.25 In order for Louisiana to 
continue to attract new business and industry and still ensure water 
sustainability for all public and private users, a comprehensive water 
management system is required.26 The emerging combination of 
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing technologies require 
close proximity to fresh surface water in order to allow for large-
                                                                                                             
 17. Id. at 284–85. 
 18. Id. at 285. 
 19. Id. (see e.g. Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d, 576 (La. 1957) 
(holding that the State is the true owner of certain water bottoms leased by 
defendants); Dardar v. LaFourche Realty Co., Inc., 55 F.3d 1082 (5th Cir. 1995) 
(finding that no state navigational servitude arose over defendant’s body of water, 
thus denying plaintiff’s access to the property)). 
 20. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 275. 
 21. Jeneen Interlandi, The New Oil, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 8, 2010, at 40. 
 22. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 275. 
 23. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, The USGS 
Water Science School (2005), http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/wuin.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/RN8T-ZRX7. 
 24. H2Woe, supra note 11. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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scale urban and agricultural development.27 While often not 
obvious, energy policy and water policy are inseparable. For 
instance, the production of oil and natural gas, as well as electricity 
generation by nuclear power, coal, gas, the sun, or flowing water, all 
require one common ingredient: an adequate water supply.28 
1. Hydraulic Fracturing and Haynesville Shale 
One industrial activity that requires copious amounts of water and 
has been a major contributing cause in the need for water 
management in Louisiana is the recent trend of hydraulic fracturing or 
“fracking.”29 Some have equated the development of this industrial 
practice to striking gold in the energy field.30 However, because the 
process requires millions of gallons of water to fracture the shale rock 
deposits,31 water supplies have been significantly affected and, 
consequently, have spurred various legal issues in water law. The 
potential impact fracking operations have on environmental 
protection concerns in turn affects Louisiana’s constitutionally-
imposed public trust doctrine.32 Louisiana Constitution Article IX, 
                                                                                                             
 27. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 274. 
 28. Id. at 279. 
 29. “The practice of hydraulic fracture stimulation in the oil and natural gas 
exploration industry involves using water pressure to create hairline fractures in 
dense geologic formations, creating a path for oil and natural gas to flow to 
wells through otherwise-impermeable rock.” Report, supra note 14, at 89. 
 30. See LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., Mineral Lease Sale Over the Top - $35 Million 
for June (June 12, 2008), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp 
=detail&aid=487, archived at http://perma.cc/L7Y9-YP7L. (Mineral Board 
Secretary Marjorie McKeithen stated, “This is an extraordinary time for Louisiana, 
particularly in north Louisiana, where we are experiencing something akin to a 
modern day gold rush due to excitement about the Haynesville Shale discovery . . . 
This month’s lease sale surpassed by more than double the bonus collections for the 
previous 11 months of FY 2007-08 combined, almost entirely because of activity in 
north Louisiana.”). 
 31. PATRICK H. MARTIN, LA. MINERAL LAW TREATISE § 1601, 558 (2012). 
 32. Laura Springer, Waterproofing the New Fracking Regulation: The 
Necessity of Defining Riparian Rights in Louisiana’s Water Law, 72 LA. L. REV. 
225, 229 (2011); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. See also Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 
283: 
This duty has been characterized by the Louisiana Supreme Court as 
constituting a ‘public trust doctrine’ that imposes a mandate on the state 
via implementing legislation to maintain, protect, and enhance its 
environment via (among other things) the regulation of water control, 
scenic rivers and streams, and the development, coordination, and 
implementation of statewide policies and programs to safeguard the 
environment and ensure the most advantageous use of the state’s 
natural resources. 
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Section 1, known as the “The Natural Resources Article,” provides 
that “[t]he natural resources of the state including air and water . . . 
shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and 
consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people.”33 In this 
respect, many critics of the fracking industry suggest that the 
operations pose environmental risks in addition to other safety 
concerns, such as “the design and soundness of well casings, potential 
chemical spills, and the ecological impact of removing millions of 
gallons of water from local water bodies.”34 
The average fracking job in Louisiana uses five million gallons of 
water,35 most notably illustrated by northwest Louisiana’s 
Haynesville Shale formation, which alone has required an average of 
more than four million gallons of water per well.36 However, the 
particular water source being exhausted for such purposes “may 
already have other users and uses that are not easily reconciled with 
the new energy uses.”37 Considering the large numbers of wells 
currently permitted or operating in the northwest Louisiana area, 
water depletion is certainly a pressing concern.38 In any event, 
fracking companies primarily rely on local groundwater resources to 
supply water for their operations because most of the gas fields are 
not riparian land, meaning that any landowner could drill a well and 
take as much water as he wants.39 Simply put, the issue arose when 
company trucks would pull up to a surface water source along a 
public right-of-way, stick a hose into the water source, and start 
pumping out water to be used in their nearby fracking operations.40 
Such use prompted an array of legal implications based on the 
contradictory language of the state’s constitutional and statutory 
provisions. In 2008, the Commissioner of Conservation, in his 
                                                                                                             
 
See Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152 (La. 
1984). 
 33. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. Louisiana’s public trust doctrine is discussed 
further infra Part II (B). 
 34. Springer, supra note 32, at 229. 
 35. Report, supra note 14, at 87. 
 36. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 279 (citing Per John Adams, 2010 LA. 
ST. B. ASS’N ENVTL. SEC., Meeting Presentation, Slide 20, New Orleans, La., (Nov. 
12, 2010) Haynesville Shale is the massive natural gas play that was discovered in 
2007 in Northwest Louisiana.). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ryan M. Seidemann, The Public Trust Doctrine and Surface Water 
Management and Conservation: A View from Louisiana, 2011 A.B.A. SEC. ENV’T, 
ENERGY, & RES. 
 39. H2Woe, supra note 11. Riparian Rights discussed in greater detail below 
infra Part I (D). 
 40. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
2015] COMMENT 489 
 
 
 
regulatory role of protecting the state’s groundwater resources, issued 
a Ground Water Use Advisory asking oil and gas companies 
operating in the Haynesville Shale field to avoid using groundwater 
for their operations and to shift, instead, to surface water sources for 
fracking purposes where “practical and feasible.”41 Unsurprisingly, 
this directive resulted in approximately 77% of water used for 
fracking operations now coming from surface water resources, as 
opposed to drillers using 100% groundwater in 2008.42 Moreover, the 
Commissioner released a series of memoranda to offer more 
specification. In a memo released September 15, 2009, the 
Commissioner reported that the Office of Conservation now requires 
fracking companies to report water sources used in their operations.43 
On November 9, 2009, the Commissioner instructed oil and gas 
operators working in the Haynesville Shale area to not use water 
drawn from domestic wells in their operations without first notifying 
the state.44 In regulating the state’s water resources, the 
Commissioner seeks to ensure the sustainable and responsible use of 
the state’s natural resources so that they remain available for the 
enjoyment and benefit of citizens both now and in the future.45 In 
                                                                                                             
 41. See Ground Water Use Advisory: Commissioner of Conservation 
Recommends Wise Water Use Planning in the Haynesville Shale, OFFICE OF 
CONSERVATION, LA. DEPT. OF NAT. RES. (Oct. 16, 2008), http://dnr.louisiana.gov 
/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=509, archived at http://perma.cc/LLP3 
-SK56 [hereinafter Advisory] (complaints from well owners that their wells were 
running dry largely instituted the 2008 Groundwater Use Advisory). 
 42. H2Woe, supra note 11. See also Ground Water Resources Commission 
updated on water use, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (Aug. 19, 2010), http://dnr.louisiana 
.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail&aid=11, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/K83Y-925A. 
 43. See Martin, supra note 31, at 564 (discussing the memorandum). 
 44. Office of Conservation reinforces that domestic water well owners must 
notify before selling water for industrial purposes, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. 
(Nov. 9, 2009), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/index.cfm?md=newsroom&tmp=detail 
&aid=402, archived at http://perma.cc/P2HW-6KNN (The Office of 
Conservation has taken the position that a domestic well owner cannot sell the 
water.). Statute defines “domestic well” to mean: 
A water well used exclusively to supply the household needs of the owner, 
lessee, or his family. Uses may include but are not limited to drinking, 
cooking, washing, sanitary purposes, lawn and garden watering, and caring 
for pets. Domestic wells shall also include wells used on private farms and 
ranches for the feeding and caring of pets and watering of lawns, excluding 
livestock, crops, and ponds. 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38:3097.2(5) (Supp. 2014). 
 45. Message from the Secretary, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES., http://dnr.louisiana 
.gov/, archived at http://perma.cc/PE4A-9ATN (last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“Our 
goal is to provide a fair, predictable and effective regulatory system that allows 
opportunities for development and economic growth through the use of our natural 
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effectively regulating surface water use, the Commissioner safeguards 
the proper and required balance of the environmental and ecological 
impacts with the economic and social benefits found in Article IX, 
section 1 of the Louisiana Constitution.46 
C. Groundwater v. Surface Waters 
After the 2008 Ground Water Use Advisory, the language of 
Louisiana’s laws concerning the public use of surface water quickly 
became a pressing issue, as Louisiana law treats surface water and 
groundwater as completely distinct.47 The Louisiana Ground Water 
Resource Commission noted that conflicting legal concepts 
concerning the state’s water rights have created a paradox that results 
in “the State charging for surface water resources that are normally in 
abundance, while allowing uncompensated withdrawal of 
groundwater resources that are often in limited supply.”48 As the 
Attorney General advised fracking companies to make the switch 
from groundwater to surface water, it is worth noting the distinction 
between the two sources and the underlying theories they respectively 
represent. 
Regarding groundwater, Louisiana has historically operated 
under the rule of capture theory, which essentially allows for the 
resource to be available for the taking by permitting any landowner 
to drill a well and “suck out basically as much as they want.”49 The 
Louisiana Circuit Court of Appeal decision in Adams v. Grigsby is 
the principal case that discusses issues of ownership and proper use 
of subsurface waters prior to the Mineral Code.50 In Adams, the 
plaintiff property owners sued the defendant oil operator for 
injunctive relief and claims for damages, maintaining that the oil 
operator depleted the aquifer on which the plaintiffs relied for 
drinking water and other personal needs.51 The court held that, in 
                                                                                                             
 
resources while at the same time ensuring protection of public safety and the 
environment.”). 
 46. Louisiana’s Surface Water Management Initiative, Act 955 of 2010: a 
voluntary process, LA. DEP’T OF NAT. RES. (2010), http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets 
/docs/secretary/DRAFT_955_pamphlet_pt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/W4UM-
D9PG. [hereinafter Initiative]. 
 47. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 286. 
 48. H2Woe, supra note 11. See also Report, supra note 14, at 1. 
 49. H2Woe, supra note 11. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2010) 
(provides for a landowner to assert ownership over whatever he can get to the 
surface). 
 50. Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1963), writ refused, 153 
So. 2d 880. 
 51. Id. at 620. 
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the context of ownership, neither party owned the percolating 
waters that lay beneath their respective properties, but only so 
much thereof as they withdrew from their individual wells.52 
In its ruling, the court stated that without statutory regulation, it 
did not have authority to establish the allocation of the amount of 
water that may be drawn from a common reservoir; thus, any 
damages the plaintiffs suffered must be regarded as a non-injurious 
loss.53 The court ultimately declined to adopt the “American Rule,” 
which is “predicated upon the equitable conclusion that the rights of 
ownership in subterranean waters from the same source are 
correlative and subject to the restriction of reasonable use.”54 In 
rejecting the American Rule, the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of 
Appeal offered that upholding the rule would “[r]equire quite a 
presumptuous and unjustified reversal of the large and uniform body 
of our jurisprudence with respect to ownership of fugitive minerals as 
exemplified by established determination.”55 Rather, the Adams court 
ultimately held that the nature of ownership of fugitive substances is 
best depicted by analogizing subterranean oil with subterranean 
waters, placing further emphasis on “the analogy by likening the right 
reserved as to oil and gas with the right to draw water from another’s 
land a right of servitude.”56 In so concluding, the court stated that it 
could not find a basis for granting the relief sought by the plaintiffs, 
declaring that “under the law and jurisprudence of this state the 
regulation of the amount of oil and gas withdrawn from a well was 
not regulated by our courts, but was only established and controlled 
by enactment by the Legislature of statutory conservation 
measures.”57 While recognizing the importance of water as a natural 
resource, the court determined that the problem with the regulation 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 624. 
 53. Id. (“It follows that the coincidental damages suffered by plaintiffs must 
be regarded as damnum absque injuria.”). 
 54. Id. at 623 (stating that the “‘American Rule’ is predicated upon the 
equitable conclusion that the rights of ownership in subterranean waters from the 
source are correlative and subject to the restriction of reasonable use.”); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 31:9 (2000) (“Landowners and others with rights in a common 
reservoir or deposit of minerals have correlative rights and duties with respect to one 
another in the development and production of the common source of minerals.”). 
 55. Adams, 152 So. 2d at 623. 
 56. Id. The Mineral Code speaks directly to the issue of “correlative rights,” 
stating: “A person with rights in a common reservoir or deposit of minerals may not 
make works, operate, or otherwise use his rights so as to deprive another 
intentionally or negligently of the liberty or enjoying his rights, or that may 
intentionally cause damage to him.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31:10 (2000). 
 57. Adams, 152 So. 2d at 623. 
492 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
and control of water supply and use would be best resolved by the 
legislature.58 
Unlike groundwater, surface water is categorized as a public thing 
owned by the state, “the use of which is largely subject to State 
oversight and environmental review.”59 While Louisiana has 
historically applied the riparian rights theory60 to surface water use, 
the law now incorporates the doctrine of reasonable use.61 For 
example, surface water was previously allowed for traditional 
domestic uses and other, largely commercial, uses to the extent they 
were deemed “reasonable.”62 However, such a determination of what 
is reasonable typically only comes after the action has occurred, 
which has been “enough to allow for the commercial exploitation of 
flowing streams and the flowering of American industry and 
commerce.”63 
D. My Land, My Water 
Surface water use in Louisiana is maintained under the theory of 
riparianism. The scope of the riparian legal doctrine “affords rights of 
reasonable use to the owners of land abutting flowing waters.”64 This 
standard views water as a common thing that is shared by anyone 
who has legal access to it, an approach that Louisiana has traditionally 
maintained.65 In essence, riparian rights allow “for traditional 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. at 624. 
 59. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 60. Riparian Rights discussed in greater detail infra Part I (D). 
 61. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 278 n.32. (“This doctrine generally 
recognizes that persons who take water from public flowing waters and put it to 
beneficial use have a right to that water in preference to persons who come later.” 
See JOESPH L. SAX, ET AL, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 13 (4th ed. 
2006)). 
 62. H2Woe, supra note 11. 
 63. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 291 (citing SAX, ET AL., supra note 
61). See also H2Woe, supra note 11 (Since 1808, Louisiana has employed the 
riparian rights theory as it applied to surface water use. Commercial uses were 
forbidden and the “natural flow” of the waters could not be reduced, as it was 
incompatible with the industrialization and growth of the state. As such, the 
State then relied on the doctrine of reasonable use. Courts used this approach 
until the enactment of Act No. 955, discussed in detail below.) 
 64. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 281. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
1442 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “riparian right” as “[t]he right of a landowner whose 
property borders on a body of water or water course. Such a landowner traditionally 
has the right to make reasonable use of the water). See also Tyler v. Wilkerson, 24 F. 
Cas. 472 (D.R.I. 1827) (providing a description of traditional American Riparianism 
and the nature of a riparian’s rights to the flowing waters that abut his or her property 
as being a right common to all riparians). 
 65. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 281 (However, such riparian rights do 
not create a property interest in the water, but rather merely the right to use). 
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domestic uses (referred to as ‘natural uses’) and other, largely 
commercial, uses to the extent they were deemed reasonable and not 
injurious of the rights of other riparians.”66 As such, Louisiana courts 
have taken this approach when determining who could use surface 
waters and for what purposes, at least until 2010 when the legislature 
addressed the issue.67 
Governing the laws of riparianism, Louisiana Civil Code article 
657 provides that “the owner of an estate bordering on running water 
may use it as it runs for the purpose of watering his estate or for other 
purposes.”68 This provision potentially allows for some consumptive 
uses by offering that such water can be used for “watering the 
estate.”69 However, room for interpretation exists when ascertaining 
what consumptive use specifically entails and what is truly 
contemplated by the word “use” and the phrase “other purposes.”70 
Moreover, Civil Code article 658 states that “the owner of an estate 
through which water runs, whether it originated there or passes from 
lands above, may make use of it while it runs over his lands . . . he 
cannot stop it or give it another direction and is bound to return it to 
its ordinary channel where it leaves his estate.”71 In this instance, the 
article’s language appears to provide some limitations to the amount 
of water riparian owners can use, essentially creating a servitude in 
favor of riparian owners for the use of waters that is less than a 
consumptive use.72 In sum, the legal sources governing riparianism, 
as they relate to surface water issues, are ambiguous and leave many 
riparian owners uncertain as to the applicable legal bounds. 
Illustrating the approach typically taken by courts, the Louisiana 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Keeley v. Schnexnailder issued a 
permanent injunction to enjoin defendant property owners from 
engaging in any activity that would interfere with the plaintiff 
property owners’ right of passage over and access to the water 
frontage on the predial servitude area in question.73 Similarly, the 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. at 291 (citing Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Law of Water Allocation in 
the Southeastern States at the Opening of the Twenty-First Century, 25 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 12 (2002)). 
 67. Id. at 291; Act No. 955 of 2010 discussed in greater detail infra Part III. 
 68. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 657 (2008). 
 69. Id. see also Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 70. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 658 (2008). 
 72. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 73. Keeley v. Schexnailder, 708 So. 2d 838, 843 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1998). (In 
Keeley, the property users established a predial servitude that gave access to a 
waterway on some of the parcels purchased by the property owners. The court went 
on to specify prohibited acts to include, but not limited to, the following: (a) parking 
trailers, boats, cars, trucks, campers or other vehicles on the servitude area; (b) 
placing brick and concrete on the servitude area so as to prevent or interfere with 
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Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal provided limits on how 
certain waters may be used by riparian owners in Jackson v. Walton.74 
In Jackson, the plaintiff landowner on one side of the bayou contested 
a contract existing between the riparian landowner on the opposite 
side of the bayou and another nearby landowner for the right to take 
water from that side of the bayou to the nearby landowner’s property 
primarily for irrigation purposes.75 The court held that injunctive 
relief should not be granted because the plaintiff failed to show any 
actual or impending damages, and the plaintiff did not offer any 
evidence indicating his need or intended use of the water in the bayou 
at present or any time in the future.76 Thus, courts have recognized 
that one riparian owner’s use of running water can detrimentally 
impact the rights of another riparian owner, though matters 
concerning “damages between private parties are best left for the 
courts to determine.”77 The Attorney General opined that, “[t]he 
reasoning relied upon in Jackson will clearly be relevant in any future 
cases on the issue of civil liability and injunctive relief . . . however, 
the issues of compensating the State for the unauthorized withdrawal 
of running water is currently unlitigated.”78 In effect, the rights 
governing riparian owners’ use of surface waters are not clearly 
defined, creating confusion as to how to properly regulate ownership 
and usage rights. 
E. Regional Needs & Interstate Opportunities 
Regional and interstate water needs are expanding, particularly 
due to the emergence of energy-driven water uses.79 Surrounding 
states are looking to Louisiana’s rich water supply to help facilitate 
their own needs. Both nationally and internationally, fresh water has 
become a valuable commodity, putting it at the forefront of economic 
growth and vitality.80 Yet, while Louisiana may have historically vast 
                                                                                                             
 
boat launching; (c) placing of a flower garden, gazebo or recreational items on the 
servitude area; and (d) erecting a fence along any part of the boundary of the 
servitude area so as to prevent access by the plaintiffs.). 
 74. Jackson v. Walton, 2 La. App. 53 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1925). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 55–56. (“There is nothing to show that the water was low at that 
time or that it would be needed to sustain the fish, and . . . plaintiff does not 
attempt to show that he had need of the water in the bayou . . . the inference 
from the pleadings and the facts is clear that unless there is dry season plaintiff 
has no reason to apprehend danger or injury.”). 
 77. Op. La. Att’y. Gen. 10-0173, 9 (2010). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 273. 
 80. Id. at 279. 
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water resources, the state also has a growing and critical need for 
water, which presents the question of “[w]hether [it] wants to develop 
methods to export its water to facilitate growth elsewhere, or it wants 
to use its last great natural resource to attract and retain development” 
within its boundaries.81 Louisiana will find itself drawn into internal 
and interstate water negotiations, and its success in safeguarding its 
interests will undoubtedly turn on the applicable water laws.82  
In their article on surface waters, co-authors and researchers 
Davis and Wilkins observe that “the present and growing interest in 
using those waters for consumptive industrial purposes, such as 
fracking, or for export to increasingly dry states such as Texas will 
soon test both the bounds of Louisiana law and the will and wisdom 
of all branches of state government.”83 Moreover, the urgency of 
confronting this situation is illustrated in the fact that many cities and 
states face a future without readily available water.84 In addressing 
interstate water needs, Louisiana has agreed to participate in interstate 
compacts,85 particularly the Sabine River Compact and the Red River 
Compact. The Sabine River Compact between Louisiana and Texas 
provides for an equitable apportionment of the waters of the Sabine 
River and its tributaries.86Similarly, under the Red River Compact, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas87 formed an arrangement 
to (1) govern the use, control, and distribution of the waters of the 
Red River and its tributaries; (2) provide for an equitable 
apportionment of the waters; (3) promote active programs for water 
conservation, flood control, and navigation development; and (4) 
                                                                                                             
 81. Id. at 278. 
 82. Id. at 284. 
 83. Id. at 296. 
 84. Id. at 276. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, Transboundary Water 
Allocation in the Twenty-First Century: Colloquium Article: Interstate Struggles 
Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle Over the Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. 
ENV’L. L. J. 828 (2005). 
 85. Dellapenna, supra note 84, at 833 (“Interstate compacts are agreements 
or contracts between states . . . interstate compacts are effective only upon 
consent by Congress as well as by each state involved in the agreement.”). 
 86. Sabine River Basin: Characterization Report, LA. DEP’T OF TRANSP. & 
DEV., LA. STATE RESERVOIR PRIORITY & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 21 (2009), 
http://wwwsp.dotd.la.gov/Inside_LaDOTD/Divisions/Engineering/Public_Works/D
am_Safety/RPDP_Reports/Sabine%20River%20Basin%20Report%20FINAL%204
.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2ZDT-4W6Y (“The compact also established a 
basis for cooperative planning and action by the States for the construction, 
operation and maintenance of projects for water conservation and utilization 
purposes on that reach of the Sabine River bordering both States, and for 
apportionment of the benefits therefrom.”). See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 46 (West 
2014). 
 87. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 46 (West 2014). 
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alleviate the water’s natural deterioration and pollution.88 In light of 
these agreements and emerging industrial practices, Louisiana’s place 
in both the regional and interstate water industry remains essential in 
order to support the growth of future water supplies, in turn requiring 
management and regulation of the state’s natural resources. 
II. AMBIGUITY GOVERNS 
At the forefront of the issue concerning proper surface water 
management and regulation of the state’s running waters are the 
various sources of Louisiana law that control water use and 
ultimately compel revision. Louisiana Civil Code article 450 
provides that running waters are owned by the state.89 The article 
provides: “Public things are owned by the State . . . in their 
capacity as public persons . . . Public things that belong to the state 
are such as running waters, the bottom of natural navigable water 
bodies, the territorial sea, and the seashore.”90 In classifying 
running waters as a public thing, Louisiana Revised Statute Section 
9:1101 specifies that 
[t]he waters of and in all bayous, rivers, streams, lagoons, 
lakes and bays . . . are declared to be the property of the state. 
There shall never to be any charge assessed against any 
person for the use of the waters of the state for municipal, 
industrial, agricultural or domestic purposes.91 
From a historical perspective, the statute recognizes that, during 
a time when running waters were classified as common things, the 
legislature deemed it necessary to ensure that no one would be 
restricted from their use.92 However, as noted in both the Code and 
statutory language, “running waters” was removed from the 
category of common things and placed under the classification of 
public things in 1954.93 This change in categorization consequently 
presents significant ramifications for the control, use, and regulation 
of surface water resources under the current constitutional scheme in 
                                                                                                             
 88. Id. 
 89. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 450 (2010). 
 90. Id. 
 91. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008). 
 92. Seidemann, supra note 38, at 3. 
 93. LA. CIV. CODE art. 449, cmt. (c) (2010) (“Running water and the seashore 
have been taken out of the category of common things by legislation declaring that 
these things are owned by the State.” See, e.g., La. R.S. 9:1101, as amended by Acts 
1954, No. 443.). See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 450 (2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 9:1101 (2008). 
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Louisiana,94 as the state is prohibited from donating publicly owned 
state property. 
As set forth in Article VII, Section 14(A) of the Louisiana 
Constitution, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this constitution, . . . 
property . . . of the state . . . shall not be loaned, pledged, or donated to 
or for any person, association, or corporation, public or private . . .”95 
Therefore, reclassifying running waters as a thing publicly owned by 
the state under Section 9:1101 effectively made it unconstitutional for 
the state to simply divest itself of such waters without receiving fair 
market value compensation in return.96 Simply put, while the state 
cannot charge for the unrestricted use of running waters pursuant to 
Section 9:1101, the state is also precluded from donating the waters 
under the constitutional language of article VII, section 14(A).97 
A. Constitutional Challenge 
1. Looking Back 
In assessing the implications of Louisiana’s laws as they affect 
the rights surrounding surface waters, it is necessary to examine the 
constitutional backdrop from which the situation arises. The general 
prohibition of donating publicly owned state property has resulted in 
numerous constitutional amendments, which have established 
exceptions and provided more legislative flexibility.98 For example, 
Committee Proposal 15, Section 16 (A) of the 1973 Constitutional 
Convention presented the general rule of the 1921 Constitution, 
providing that 
[t]he . . . property or things of value of the state, or of any 
political corporation thereof, shall not be loaned, pledged, or 
donated to or for any person or persons, associations or 
corporations, public or private, nor shall the state nor any 
political corporation purchase or subscribe to the capital 
stock or stock of any corporation or association whatever or 
for any private enterprise.99 
                                                                                                             
 94. Seidemann, supra note 38, at 3. See generally LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(A). 
 95. LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(A). 
 96. Seidemann, supra note 38, at 4. 
 97. Since 1954, when converted from common to public things, the state 
has not been able to allow unrestricted use without some form of remuneration. 
 98. Lee Hargrave, Limits on Borrowing and Donations in the Louisiana 
Constitution of 1975, 62 LA. L. REV. 137, 142 (2001). 
 99. Id. at 143 (citing IV Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention 
of 1973: Convention Instruments at 160)). 
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However, Section (B) proposed new language to allow for an 
exception to Section (A) that would give more flexibility to 
governmental entities, stating that “[n]othing contained in this 
Section shall prevent intercooperation between the state and its 
political corporations or between the state or its political 
corporations and the US, or between the state or its political 
corporations and any public or private association or corporation or 
individual for a public purpose.”100 In this respect, Section (B) 
allows for agreements with private interests for any public purpose, 
substantially relaxing Section 16 (A).101 The committee comments 
suggest that Section (B) intended to allow the “[l]oan, pledge, or 
donation of property of the state or its political corporations only for 
public purposes . . . under this Section the term ‘public purpose’ is 
left to interpretation by the judiciary so that there is sufficient 
flexibility for a lasting and workable document.”102 
In examining the textual language,103 it appears that the 
Constitution does not define the terms “donation,” “property,” or 
“things of value.”104 Nevertheless, the development of case law 
suggests a narrow definition of “donation” to best adhere to 
traditional Civil Code concepts.105 A donation is currently defined as 
“a gratuitous act, one ‘which is made without condition and merely 
from liberality.’”106 To get around the constitutional language of the 
prohibition on donating state-owned property, proposals such as 
“Conditional Transfers to the State” or “Leases” have been 
suggested.107 A simplistic reading of Section 14 suggests that the state 
is not prohibited from leasing state property to private interests.108 
In an effort to work around the constitutional prohibition on 
donations of state-owned property, prior judicial analysis examines 
alternative solutions, such as leasing the property or allowing use for 
public utility purposes. In State v. Board of Commissioners, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that leases of state property are 
                                                                                                             
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. (citing I Records of the Louisiana Constitutional Convention of 1973: 
Journal of Proceedings at 130 (July 6, 1973)). 
 103. “[T]he funds, credit, property, or things of value of the state . . . shall not be 
loaned, pledged, or donated to or for any person, association, or corporation, public 
or private.” LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(A). 
 104. Hargrave, supra note 98, at 156. 
 105. Id. at 157. 
 106. Id. Louisiana Civil Code Article 1468 defines a donation inter vivos as a 
contract by which a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at 
present and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of another, called the donee, 
who accepts it. 
 107. See generally Hargrave, supra note 98, at 157–62. 
 108. Id. at 158; see also LA. CONST. art. VII, § 14(A). 
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acceptable, thus affirming the lower court’s ruling, which allowed the 
Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans to sublease a 
warehouse it leased from the Federal Government.109 Likewise, in 
State v. Cumberland Telephone & Telephone Company, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court permitted the free use of state property in upholding a 
statute that allowed telephone companies to lawfully place their lines 
on public lands without cost, reasoning that such use was not within 
the limitation of the 1879 Constitution.110 Relying on the Cumberland 
decision, the court in State v. South Central Bell Telephone Company, 
held that the defendant utility company was not required to 
compensate the state for the use of public lands in placing and 
maintaining telephone poles, lines, and other systems.111 In allowing 
this kind of use of state-owned property, the court maintained a strict 
construction and noted that the state did not give up control of the 
land because it still retained all other ownership rights over the 
property.112 Additionally, the South Central Bell court relied on 
Louisiana Civil Code article 1468 to define a donation, noting that 
because the state still retained full ownership over the land used by 
South Central Bell, it could not claim that the land was 
unconstitutionally donated.113 
In the current context, the Attorney General has opined that 
allowing industries to withdraw public water for its private interests is 
an impermissible donation because running water is a public thing 
owned by the state.114 In this instance, “when an oil and gas company 
                                                                                                             
 109. La. v. Bd. of Comm’rs., 153 La. 664, 670 (1923) (“The proposed sublease 
is not, within the meaning of the constitutional mandate, a loan, pledge, or grant, of 
any fund, credit, or thing of value, of the state or of the dock board. The right of 
occupancy of the warehouse is not now of any value to the state, or to the dock 
board, except for the right to sublease it and collect the rent.”). 
 110. State v. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co., 52 La. Ann. 1411, 1415–16 (1900) 
(“The State, as we take it, was not divested of its power to permit a telephone 
company to use an insignificant portion of her lands to plant its poles and string its 
wires. It is not a ‘loan,’ ‘pledge’ or ‘grant,’ as we read the statute but a mere 
permission to use . . . if the use is not in any manner to the State’s prejudice. We 
have not found that the power of the State is so restrained that it cannot permit a 
quasi public corporation to string its wires over her hands.”). 
 111. State v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 619 So. 2d 749 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1993). 
 112. Id. at 754 (“The legislature has expressly provided that telephone poles and 
wires may not obstruct ‘the ordinary use of the roads, works, railroads, and waters.’ 
Thus, it is clear that the State still retains the use of the lands on which the telephone 
equipment sits.”). 
 113. Id. (“A donation ‘is an act by which the donor divests himself, at present 
and irrevocably, of the thing given, in favor of the done who accepts it’.”). LA. CIV. 
CODE. ANN. art. 1468 (2012). 
 114. Op. La. Att’y. Gen. 08-0176, 4 (2010) (“Clearly, if the water . . . is running 
water . . . it belongs to the State of Louisiana and is a public thing that cannot be 
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appropriates millions of gallons of the public’s running water, the 
withdrawal must come with a price tag to avoid being an 
unconstitutional donation,”115 so as to adhere to the explicit 
constitutional language set forth in Section 14(A). However, the 
Louisiana Revised Statutes do not permit such a price tag.116 
Furthermore, the aforementioned jurisprudence does not directly 
resolve the right to use publicly owned surface waters. The idea of 
leasing running water has not yet specifically been addressed or 
allowed. In addition, use of the commodity for industrial activities 
such as fracking neither serves a public utility purpose nor provides a 
public benefit as the use of the land for telephone services did in 
Cumberland and South Central Bell.117 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine 
In furtherance of the constitutional challenges surrounding the 
issue at hand, Louisiana’s public trust doctrine comes into play and 
presents additional obstacles. Article IX, Section 1, of the Louisiana 
Constitution states that “the natural resources of the state, including 
air and water . . . shall be protected, conserved, and replenished 
insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare 
of the people.”118 From this reading of the article, it is clear that while 
the Louisiana Legislature intended for the state to own running waters 
in its public capacity, the state constitution does not afford the state 
with any regulatory authority or appropriate enforcement power over 
the use of such waters, but instead, the constitution merely vests the 
ownership of the resource in the state.119 Furthermore, Article IX 
“requires a balancing process in which environmental costs and 
benefits must be given full and careful consideration along with 
economic, social and other factors.”120 In making such a 
determination, and before granting approval of a particular proposed 
action affecting the government, an agency or official must 
                                                                                                             
 
donated by allowing a person with a tanker truck to pump it out of the creek from a 
public right-of-way.”). 
 115. Springer, supra note 32, at 230. See LA. CONST. art. VII, pt. I § 14(A). 
 116. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008). 
 117. Use of public waters for industrial purposes such as hydraulic fracturing 
does not squarely fit within the strict application of serving the public interest as the 
private entities incur a profitable gain while depleting the natural resources of the 
state. 
 118. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 119. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 120. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n 452 So. 2d 1152, 1157 
(La. 1984). 
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reasonably “determine that adverse environmental impacts have been 
minimized or avoided as much as possible consistently with the 
public welfare.”121 In this context, the Louisiana Supreme Court has 
held that the constitutional and statutory language present a very 
broad conception of the public trust doctrine.122 In the absence of 
specific legislation, Louisiana’s public trust doctrine does not identify 
what entity should undertake the analysis or the ramifications of 
failing to adhere to the resulting analysis.123 
However, in 1978, the Louisiana Legislature charged the 
Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources with authorizing 
environmental regulations by enacting Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 30:2013.124 Further, the legislature expanded the statute a year 
later with The Environmental Affairs Act of 1979, which created the 
Environmental Control Commission, to be tasked with reviewing 
permit applications to determine whether a proposed project or 
facility complied with constitutional and legislative standards.125 
Assuring that reasonable decisions were rationally connected, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court in Save Ourselves, Inc. v. Louisiana 
Environmental Control Commission noted the importance of doing 
so, particularly “in a case such as this where the agency performs as a 
public trustee and is duty bound to demonstrate that it has properly 
exercised the discretion vested in it by the constitution and the 
statute.”126 The 1984 case asserts the basic proposition that the public 
trust doctrine requires state actors to review the impact of their 
decisions on natural resources and the environment.127 The 
constitutional doctrine is founded in the state’s function as “a 
                                                                                                             
 121. Id. at 1157. 
 122. Martin, supra note 31, at 564. See Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1157. 
 123. Seidemann, supra note 38. See also Lee Hargrave, The Public Trust 
Doctrine: A Plea for Precision, 53 LA. L. REV. 1535, 1540 (1993) (arguing that the 
public trust doctrine can only operate through specific legislative action, “. . . custom 
under state law only produces law if it is consistent with legislation. In any event, 
any kind of public trust doctrine coming from long term practices would have to be 
subordinate to the specific rules and provisions of statutes.”). 
 124. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2013 (2000) (“All powers and duties granted 
to the Environmental Control Commission prior to the effective date of this 
Section are hereby transferred to and shall be vested in the secretary. Where the 
term ‘commission’ is used in this Subtitle, it shall mean the secretary of the 
Department of Environmental Quality.”). 
 125. Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1156 (“In 1978 the legislature directed 
the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources to promulgate regulations to 
prevent the transportation, treatment or disposal of hazardous wastes except by 
permit issued upon a showing that the particular project or facility to be licensed 
does not involve substantial risk to the environment.”); see also LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 30:2013 (2000). 
 126. Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1159–60. 
 127. See id. See also Seidemann, supra note 38. 
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protector of public health and welfare where the latter is rooted in a 
property interest that is held in trust for the people of the state.”128 
This duty essentially imposes an obligation on the state to “maintain, 
protect and enhance [the state’s] environment via the regulation of 
water control, scenic rivers and streams, and the development, 
coordination, and implementation of statewide policies and programs 
to safeguard the environment and ensure the most advantageous use 
of the state’s natural resources.”129 
III. ACT NO. 955 OF 2010: AN OVERVIEW 
A. Starting Anew 
In seeking to confront the ambiguity that the state Constitution 
and statutory laws present regarding public use of running water, the 
Louisiana Legislature enacted Act 955 during the 2010 Regular 
Session to address the issue of how to regulate the sale of running 
surface waters.130 However, this attempt to reassess and improve the 
current water scheme fell short of adequate resolution. Act 955 of 
2010 expressly provides the Secretary of the Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) with the ability to enter into cooperative endeavor 
agreements with any person or entity seeking to withdraw running 
surface water.131 In simple terms, the law implements a procedure to 
allow the DNR to enter into agreements of monetary value for the 
withdrawal of running surface water from Louisiana water bodies132 
in order to fit within the context of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 
9:1101. Prior to the institution of Act 955, no legislation offered 
specific protections for the state’s surface waters.133 Act 955 
somewhat filled this gap, specifically directing its provisions to a 
person or entity, who is not a riparian owner, and who seeks to 
withdraw water from the running surface waters of the state.134 
Additionally, in allowing for the consumptive use of the state’s 
surface waters, the Act requires an environmental analysis of any 
such use in an attempt to balance the environmental and ecological 
impacts with the economic and social benefits.135 
                                                                                                             
 128. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 283. 
 129. Id. (citing Save Ourselves, Inc., 452 So. 2d at 1154). 
 130. 2010 La. Acts 955 (codified as LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:961–63 (Supp. 
2014)). 
 131. Id. See also Initiative, supra note 46. 
 132. 2010 La. Acts 955. 
 133. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 134. 2010 La. Acts 955. 
 135. Id. 
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B. Controlling the Waters  
In 2010, the Attorney General issued a series of opinions that 
analyzed whether the state has control over various types of surface 
waters.136 In the collectively issued opinions, the Attorney General 
opined that the state owns the running waters of the water bodies, 
irrespective of the ownership of their beds, and that the law should 
treat the water separately from the land over which it runs.137 The 
opinions directly resulted from the demands for water made by 
nontraditional water users, particularly the companies involved in the 
northwest Louisiana fracking industry.138 As mentioned in Part 
I(B)(i), operators were seeking to develop natural gas from the shale 
formations, which requires fracturing the shale, “a practice that is 
done with highly pressurized and often adulterated water—millions of 
gallons per well.”139 A 2010 Attorney General opinion stated that the 
running waters of the state are “public things” and cannot be given 
away because the Louisiana Constitution prohibits the donation of 
things of value.140 Moreover, the opinion allowed for agreements to 
put a price on water withdrawn on a per gallon basis, yet it also 
allowed for industry to show some other form of compensation to the 
state, such as demonstrating an increase in public revenue.141 
C. You Say You Want a Resolution 
Following the Attorney General’s rulings that affirmed 
Louisiana’s riparian law and restricted the waters available for 
fracking to surface waters, the legislature’s quick enactment of Act 
955 allowed the state to authorize water withdrawals from the 
running waters of the state by nonriparian users.142 Although the 
                                                                                                             
 136. See Op. La. Att’y. Gen. Op. Nos. 08-0176, 09-0028, 09-0066, 09-0291, 10-
0289 and 10-0173 (2010). (No. 08-0176 (Mar. 17, 2010): The State owns the 
running water as a public thing, however (Nov. 23, 2010): A riparian owner may 
access and “use” running water for his estate, but the water remains a public thing 
owned by the state). 
 137. Id. See Chaney v. State Mineral Bd., 444 So. 2d 105, 109 (La. 1983) 
(discussing the distinction between private and public things in relation to 
ownership water and waterbeds. “On the one hand, the bed and bottom of a non-
navigable river or stream is a private thing belonging either to the riparian 
owners or the state. On the other hand, the water which traverses that private bed 
is a public thing.”). See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 450 (2010). 
 138. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 289. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Op. La. Atty. Gen. 08-0176 (2010). See LA. CONST. art. VII, pt. I § 14(A). 
 141. Op. La. Atty. Gen. 08-0176 (2010). See also footnote 149; price charged for 
consumptive use is $0.15/1,000 gallons. 
 142. 2010 La. Acts 955. Davis & Wilkins, supra note 1, at 289. 
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legislature may not donate a public thing, under statutory 
authorization it may sell a public thing, pursuant to Act 955.143 
Thus, the Attorney General’s memorandum opined that persons 
“with the possible exception of riparian landowners, are not 
authorized to remove State owned surface water without obtaining 
the prior written approval of the State and without paying fair 
value.”144 More specifically, the Act recognizes that running water 
is a public thing owned by the state pursuant to Louisiana Civil 
Code article 450 and Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:1101. The 
Act provides that the DNR is the state agency charged with 
“ensuring that all State rights in running water are protected, and 
especially ensuring that the State receives compensation for the sale 
of a public thing of value so as to ensure compliance with La. Const. 
Art. VI, Sec. 14.”145 Moreover, under Louisiana Civil Code articles 
657 and 658, riparian landowners may use such waters for the 
benefit of their estates without providing payment to the state.146 
However, this riparian use of the water “does not convey ownership, 
and cannot be used to the detriment of other riparian landowners.”147 
The overall design of the Act also provides for explicit provisions 
through the “Plan of Water Use,”148 as well as offering the applicant 
the option to submit an Economic Impact Report (EIR), which 
allows the applicant to select to pay the state for the water they use 
at the rate in place at the time of usage.149 Upon submission, the 
                                                                                                             
 143. Id. See also LA. CONST. art. VII, pt. I § 14(A); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:1101 (2008). 
 144. Memorandum from Office of Att’y Gen. & Sec., Dept. of Nat. Res. on 
Management and Sale of State Surface Waters to All State Surface Water Managers 
(Feb. 5, 2010), available at http://dnr.louisiana.gov/assets/docs/conservation/ground 
water/Appendix_F.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DV6Y-KH8V. 
 145. Id. Op. La. Att’y Gen. 10-0173 (La. 2010). 
 146. Op. La. Att’y Gen. 10-0173 (La. 2010). See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 
657–658 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1101 (2008). 
 147. Op. La. Att’y Gen. 10-0173 (La. 2010). 
 148. Initiative, supra note 46 (To participate in a CEA the applicant must submit 
a mandatory application-specific Plan of Water Use, which will be appended to the 
agreement. The plan is required to be certified by a professional and contain certain 
details such as a statement of the water body’s name, a description of the public 
interest in the project, and the proposed end-user of the withdrawn water, among 
other things.). 
 149. Id. (A project-specific EIR must be included with the application if the 
applicant seeks recognition of “in-kind value received in lieu of payment for the 
withdrawal.” In this instance, the report must include the following detailed 
description of how the state will be compensated: the types of increased tax 
revenue that will be generated; how the use to which the water will be put will 
be in the public interest; the specific economic developments that will ensue and 
what the specific social benefits will be that ensue. Once the EIR is submitted, 
the Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration then reviews the application for 
consistency with the State’s Master Plan. Under this design, the State will then 
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Office of Coastal Protection and Restoration reviews the application 
for consistency with the master plan.150 
D. Experiencing Technical Difficulties 
However, while the Act intended to resolve the legal discrepancy, 
and despite all of the advancements the Louisiana Legislature made 
with Act 955, several problems still remain that have prevented total 
and clear resolution of the ambiguous sources that govern the state’s 
surface water use. First, the law exempts from its coverage 
agricultural and aquacultural uses, meaning that two of the most 
prominent surface water users in Louisiana go unchecked.151 As such, 
if these exemptions are allowed to continue to go unrestricted, the 
public trust doctrine may be violated.152 From this perspective, the 
issue arises of “whether the law violates the public trust doctrine by 
instructing the state’s trustee agencies to essentially look the other 
way if these exempted uses are not unilaterally ensuring that their 
uses of the state’s surface waters are not harmful to the resource or the 
environment.”153 
Second, the law preserves the existing riparian rights to surface 
waters without mentioning what the rights entail or whether they 
“might be subject to the public trust doctrine analysis of ‘other natural 
resource uses’.”154 In effect, the situation presents the issue of riparian 
rights that may be in conflict with one another, as well as certain 
activity that may be exempted by this reservation.155 The only 
authority concerning riparian rights with regard to water access is 
                                                                                                             
 
receive valuable compensation for the use of its surface waters in the form of 
increased tax and royalty revenue and increased job creation.). 
 150. Id. (If usage is approved, the state and the company enter into a cooperative 
endeavor agreement (discussed supra footnote 148) that may or may not recommend 
limitations on withdrawal and use.). 
 151. See H.R. 1486, 2010 Reg. Sess. (La. 2010). See also Seidemann, supra note 
38; Report, supra note 14, at 28 (“Following the adoption of Act 955, the Louisiana 
Legislature approved Act 994 of the 2010 legislative session, (La. R.S. 9:1103). This 
exemption is found in Act 944, which expanded riparian rights for agricultural and 
aquaculture uses. The legislature recognized the beneficial use of surface water for 
agricultural and aquacultural purposes by riparian owners. The legislature decided 
that ‘waters used in agricultural or aquacultural pursuits are not consumed, rather 
they are merely used’ and that no prohibited donation was created by their use free 
of charge.”). 
 152. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 153. Id. 
 154. H.R. 1486, supra note 151; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:961(A) (Supp. 
2014). See also Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 155. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
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Louisiana Civil Code article 456, which simply provides that riparian 
owners’ rights are “burdened by a public use for the mooring of 
vessels and the drying of nets along their property.”156 A simple 
reading of the provision does not reason to grant riparian owners any 
specific right to use water from the waterway along which their 
property is situated, thus it remains unclear what, if any, rights have 
actually been reserved to riparian owners through the Act’s 
exemption.157 
Additionally, Act 955 offers voluntary compliance, allowing users 
to opt out of the cooperative endeavor agreements (CEA).158 
However, if a user chooses not to enter an agreement, he “risk[s] 
running afoul of the public trust doctrine as well as threatening the 
analyses undertaken for those who have submitted to the process.”159 
Lastly, the Act was merely set forth as a temporary provision to allow 
the use of surface waters to continue through the next regular session 
of the Louisiana Legislature, eventually ending in 2012.160 Therefore, 
the need for appropriate long-term regulation of these resources 
remains unanswered. Yet, the legislature extended the legislation by 
passing Act 261 of 2012 “[t]o amend and reenact . . . relative to 
withdrawal of surface water; to extend the time frame within which 
opportunities for cooperative agreements for such withdrawal may be 
entered into; to provide for approval by legislative committees of 
certain cooperative endeavor agreements . . .”161 Act 261 is clearly 
not a permanent solution, as it only adds that no new agreement shall 
be entered into if the department received the application after 
December 31, 2014.162 
In addition to the underlying issues accompanying Act 955, no 
direct form of punishment for noncompliance with the law’s 
                                                                                                             
 156. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 456 (2010). 
 157. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 158. Initiative, supra note 46. Contracts, DIV. OF ADMIN., STATE OF LA., http: 
//www.prd.doa.louisiana.gov/LaTrac/contracts/help.cfm, archived at http://perma.cc 
/7QNZ-YPA3 (last updated Jan. 12, 2015) (CEAs are agreements, which La. Const. 
art. VII, sect. 14 authorizes, for a public purpose, among the State and its political 
subdivisions or political corporations, and with the United States or its agencies, or 
with any public or private association, corporation, or individual. Since a CEA is a 
form of contract, “[i]t would be in the best interest of the state of Louisiana to have 
all such agreements reviewed by an arm of the state that is not a party to the 
agreement . . . all [CEAs] require the expenditure of public funds to the Office of 
Contractual Review for review and approval.” Executive Order BJ 2008-29). 
 159. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 160. H.R. 1486, supra note 151. 
 161. H.R. 532, 2012 Reg. Sess. (La. 2012). 
 162. Id. The act also mentions, however, that “existing agreements may be 
renewed in two-year increments but shall terminate no later than December 31, 
2020.” 
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provisions currently exists.163 The environmental laws of Louisiana 
do not prove substantial enough to provide for a direct enforcement 
action or to implement regulatory penalties and fines for the 
unauthorized use of the state’s running surface waters.164 The 
Attorney General’s Office held that in their opinion, “the State may 
seek either recompense for an unauthorized use of water or injunctive 
relief to stop an ongoing unauthorized use of water.”165 Before any 
action is initiated though, the DNR must first determine that 
unauthorized use has actually occurred, as the agency is charged with 
managing the state’s natural resources, including running waters by 
virtue of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 36:351, as well as being 
the permitting agency identified by Act 955.166 However, under the 
current scheme, individuals using the state’s waters without the 
appropriate permission would only be liable for the misappropriation 
of state things, rather than for “the more direct problems of 
degradation and harm to the environment.”167 Instead of punishing 
violators with directly applicable punishments, authorities are left 
with general provision prohibitions in the Criminal Code to stop those 
who choose not to comply with Act . 955.168 For instance, because of 
the lack of environmentally specific penal provisions in place, state 
actors are limited to using theft of state property laws for the 
unauthorized use of surface waters169 instead of specific regulatory 
penalties. 
IV. CHANGE IS GONNA COME 
The current language of Louisiana’s laws and governing scheme 
clearly does not offer a workable solution for adequate surface water 
regulation. Notably, the increase in fracking operations within the 
state has highlighted the fact that Louisiana can no longer ignore the 
essential need for a highly technical water regulation and 
management plan. As this comment has discussed, current theories 
of ownership and rights of use of the state’s running waters are not 
                                                                                                             
 163. See generally H.R. 1486, supra note 151. 
 164. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 165. La. Att’y Gen. Op. No. 10-0173 (2010). 
 166. Id. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36:351(B) (2006) (“The Department of Natural 
Resources, through its offices and officers, shall be responsible for the conservation, 
management, and development of water, minerals, and other such natural resources 
of the state, including coastal management, except timber and fish and wildlife and 
their habitats.”). 
 167. Seidemann, supra note 38. 
 168. Id. See also, La. Att’y Gen., supra note 165. 
 169. La. Att’y Gen., supra note 165 (“Upon a determination that such an 
unauthorized use has occurred, either the local district attorney or the AG has the 
authority to pursue criminal and/or civil actions against the violator.”). 
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clearly delineated, leaving many uncertain as to what their rights 
specifically entail. In addition, while attempting to resolve the legal 
complexities, Act 955 has failed to fully provide complete guidance 
or resolution. 
Keeping the jurisprudential perspective in mind, it seems that the 
obvious solution requires legislative action and statutory modification 
in order to provide a conclusive guideline for the entire state to 
follow. However, before statutory modification can be approved, 
much less proposed, Act 955 must, at the very least, outline the rights 
of riparian owners. While an amendment to the current statutory 
language would be an appropriate remedy, the vague provisions of 
Act 955 must first be addressed and clearly delineated to properly 
align with the various sources governing Louisiana’s water law. 
State actors should be called upon to reexamine and expound 
upon the rights of riparian owners and other individuals who seek to 
use publicly owned running waters for personal profit. In addition, 
Louisiana’s position at the forefront of the emerging water economy 
demonstrates that the legislature should strongly consider the issues 
that underlie interstate agreements, while still preserving its own 
water supply and needs. Clearly, exploration and production activities 
such as hydraulic fracturing have a significantly greater impact on the 
state’s water depletion than other forms of public use; yet use of the 
state’s surface waters for such purposes would provide the state with 
an increase in tax revenue as well as afford more jobs in the 
industry.170 In this instance, the legislature should design a permanent 
statutory distinction between use of surface waters for profitable 
industrial activities versus the traditional domestic public use. 
Reiterating what the Louisiana Second Circuit held in Adams v. 
Grigsby, “we are not unaware of the growing value and importance of 
water as a natural resource . . . in some instances, it is more valuable 
and necessary than oil or gas. However, the problem of the regulation 
and control of water supply and use addresses itself to the 
[legislature] . . . .”171 
In response to the Louisiana Legislature’s recent request172 that 
the Louisiana State Law Institute “study the legal issues surrounding 
groundwater and surface water law and any needs for revision to 
                                                                                                             
 170. Report, supra note 14, at 86. (“In a 2010 economic impact study, economist 
Loren Scott noted that Haynesville Shale activity benefited [Louisiana] through 
$16.9 billion in business sales, $4.3 billion in new household earnings, and more 
than 111,000 jobs tied directly or indirectly to the activity. Expansion in the oil and 
natural gas industry sector alone contributed nine percent of all jobs created in the 
U.S. in 2011.”). 
 171. Adams v. Grigsby, 152 So. 2d 619, 624 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1963), writ 
refused, 153 So. 2d 880. 
 172. S. Con. Res. 53, 2012 Reg. Sess. (La. 2012). 
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current law,” the Institute thereby created a Water Law Committee, 
comprised of academicians, practitioners, judges, and environmental 
law specialists.173 With the added participation of individuals with 
expertise and interest in this vital area of law, the Law Institute has 
recommended that the state legislature allow the entity to enact a 
comprehensive Water Code to “integrate[s] all of its water 
resources . . . and enable Louisiana to successfully manage and 
conserve its water resources as it prepares to face the inevitable 
challenges that lie ahead.”174 
From commencement of the project, the Law Institute 
immediately recognized that a “holistic approach to potential 
legislative reform of any of Louisiana’s water laws was 
imperative.”175 In urging the need for water reform,176 the Law 
Institute thereby recommended that a Water Code Committee be 
enacted and entrusted with “the responsibility of continuing to study 
Louisiana’s current treatment of running surface water and 
groundwater, with a view towards the development of a 
comprehensive Water Code that integrates all of Louisiana’s water 
resources.”177 Due to the inadequate guidance governing Louisiana’s 
water system, the Institute’s proposed Water Code project presents 
the best workable solution to the state’s need to overcome this long-
standing problem. As noted by one committee member, water 
concerns are “[g]rowing in the national consciousness,”178 and the 
time has passed for expansive and comprehensive reform. 
CONCLUSION 
While Act 955 purports to offer a workable regulatory regime 
addressing the state’s water resources, the legislative measure has 
proven less than adequate. Louisiana’s incompatible constitutional 
                                                                                                             
 173. Louisiana State Law Institute, Report in Response to SCR 53 of the 2012 
Regular Session: The Use of Surface Water Versus Groundwater, 1 (2014). SCR 53 
points out that Louisiana’s disparate legal regimes for groundwater and for surface 
water have yielded “various and often conflicting legal rules . . . .” 
 174. Id. at 87. 
 175. Id. at 3. 
 176. “It has been almost 200 years since there has been any substantive revision 
of the Civil Code’s provisions on riparian rights, and it has been 40 years since the 
legislature enacted Louisiana’s Mineral Code.” Id. at 87. 
 177. Id. The recommendation provides that the Committee function in an 
interdisciplinary capacity, consisting of the following members: “academicians, 
practitioners, scientists with expertise in hydrology, and government representatives 
with expertise in Louisiana’s water resources and the state’s existing administrative 
system of water management.” 
 178. Mark S. Davis and Michael Pappas, Escaping the Sporphase Maze: 
Protecting State Waters Within the Commerce Clause, 73 LA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
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and statutory provisions have left supervisory authorities, as well 
as private entities and landowners, uncertain as to what exactly 
their obligations and corresponding rights entail. As such, the state 
can no longer function under the existing regime if they want to 
properly address the underlying issues imposed by riparian rights 
and recent fracking activities and remedy the mismanagement that 
has been troubling both agencies and citizens alike for far too long. 
Louisiana cannot afford to miss out on the economic opportunities 
and advantages that are so intertwined with this natural resource. 
The legislature’s implementation of a comprehensive water code 
that integrates the state’s water resources will serve to provide a 
long-term solution to the current inoperable scheme governing 
Louisiana’s surface waters. 
[T]he solution to the problem lies in the adoption of 
comprehensive legislation designed to treat all related 
problems of water law. The present system, composed only of 
statutes passed to meet limited problems, has produced a 
number of conflicts from which inequitable results are apt to 
follow.179 
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 179. Jerry G. Jones, Water Rights in Louisiana, 16 LA. L. REV. 500, 511 (1956). 
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